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ANALYZING SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES: 
GETTING STRICT WITH JUDGES 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Hughes1 
(decided November 19, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court has left many stones unturned.2  In its landmark deci-
sion, District of Columbia v. Heller,3 the Court acknowledged that 
Second Amendment rights, although fundamental, were in no way 
unlimited.4  In reviewing the challenged law, the Heller Court did not 
apply a specific level of scrutiny but indicated that it would be un-
constitutional on any level.5  On the other hand, the Court explicitly 
rejected rational basis scrutiny and Justice Stephen Breyer’s “interest-
balancing” test.6  This, at the very least, implied that the Court would 
apply either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny when faced with 
Second Amendment challenges.  The Court’s failure to analyze 
whether the challenged law should be reviewed under intermediate or 
strict scrutiny has led to inconsistencies in the lower courts. 
Many courts have skipped this analysis completely and ap-
plied a particular standard following the approach of previous courts.7  
Other courts have conducted an analysis but their rationale for apply-
ing intermediate or strict scrutiny has also been inconsistent.8  Many 
 
1 People v. Hughes, 1 N.E.3d 298 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
3 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
4 Id. at 626. 
5 Id. at 628-29. 
6 Id. at 628 n.27. 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); People v. Nivar, 915 
N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2011). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Eng-
1
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courts assume that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to Second 
Amendment challenges unless the statute contains a blanket prohibi-
tion, which would then trigger strict scrutiny.9  This approach runs 
the risk of judges justifying regulations with their personal policy 
preferences because under intermediate scrutiny almost any law can 
be upheld.  Under Heller, the scope of judicial discretion to decide 
the appropriate level of scrutiny is too broad and allows for too much 
subjectivity in evaluating the constitutionality of a statute. 
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in People v. 
Hughes,10 applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute making it a class 
C felony for anyone previously convicted of a crime to possess an un-
licensed, loaded handgun and found it constitutional.11  The New 
York Court of Appeals failed to analyze whether defendant Frank 
Hughes’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense was substantially burdened triggering strict 
scrutiny.12  Instead, the Court of Appeals followed other courts in ap-
plying intermediate scrutiny.  This Case Note addresses the levels of 
scrutiny which both federal and New York courts have applied when 
analyzing laws and regulations that burden Second Amendment 
rights, and more specifically, whether the New York Court of Ap-
peals analyzed Penal Law section 265.01 accurately when upholding 
it under intermediate scrutiny. 
II. PEOPLE V. HUGHES 
A. Factual and Procedural Background 
The defendant frequently stayed at his ex-girlfriend’s apart-
ment in Hempstead, Long Island.13  One day, while at the apartment, 
he heard shooting outside and thought that he should bring a gun with 
him the next day for protection.14  The defendant returned the follow-
ing day with an unlicensed, loaded handgun.15  While standing out-
side the apartment, the defendant was approached by two men, one of 
 
strum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009). 
9 See, e.g., People v. Foster, 915 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2010). 
10 1 N.E.3d 298 (N.Y. 2013). 
11 Id. at 302. 
12 Id. at 299. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 299. 
2
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whom was nicknamed “Maniac Guns.”16  After an altercation, the de-
fendant drew the handgun and killed one of the men.17  The defendant 
was charged with murder and criminal possession of a weapon in the 
second degree.18  He was acquitted of the murder charge, but convict-
ed of the weapon possession charge, a class C felony.19  Because the 
defendant had a previous misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest, 
he was also convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third 
degree—possession of a firearm by one previously convicted of a 
crime, a class D felony.20  Without the prior misdemeanor conviction, 
the defendant would have served a maximum sentence of one year in 
jail, but was instead sentenced to three and one-half years in prison.21 
At trial, the defendant moved to set aside his conviction for 
weapon possession, but the court denied his motion.22  The Appellate 
Division, Second Department affirmed the conviction.23  The defend-
ant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Penal 
Law section 265 violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms, 
and was therefore unconstitutional.24 
B. Court of Appeals Analysis 
The issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether 
the statute violated the defendant’s Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms.  Pursuant to Penal Law section 265.03, an individual 
who “possesses any loaded firearm” is guilty of criminal possession 
of a weapon in the second degree, unless “such possession takes 
place in such person’s home or place of business.”25  However, this 
“home or business exception” does not apply if the person “has been 
previously convicted of any crime.”26  The defendant argued that, in 
taking him out of the exception and elevating his weapon possession 
conviction to a class C felony based upon a prior misdemeanor con-
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 299. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. (citing People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011)). 
24 Id. at 299-300. 
25 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 300. 
26 Id. 
3
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viction, the statute impermissibly infringed on his Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms.27  The defendant’s prior misde-
meanor precluded his invoking the home or business exception to Pe-
nal Law section 265.03, which would have otherwise applied.28  
Thus, without a previous conviction, the defendant would only have 
been found guilty of a class A misdemeanor, rather than a class C 
felony.29  The defendant further argued that the court was required to 
apply strict scrutiny because the challenged statute interfered with a 
fundamental right, and any state law that infringes on a fundamental 
right must be strictly scrutinized to determine if it is narrowly tailored 
to serve “a compelling state interest.”30 
Although the Second Amendment confers on citizens the right 
to keep and bear arms, this right is not absolute.31  States are free to 
pass laws and regulations which promote public safety, as long as 
those laws do not unconstitutionally burden a citizen’s Second 
Amendment rights.32  Thus, in order to determine whether Penal Law 
section 265.03 violated the Second Amendment, the court first had to 
determine which level of scrutiny applied to Second Amendment 
challenges in New York.33  Similar to many other courts, the Court of 
Appeals adopted an intermediate standard of scrutiny.34 
Under intermediate scrutiny, the court analyzed whether New 
York’s penal law bears a substantial relationship to achieving an im-
 
27 Id. at 299-300. 
28 Id. at 299. 
29 Id. 
30 Brief of Defendant-Appellant, People v. Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2011) (No. 2009-07374), 2010 WL 9586094, at *32. 
31 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. 
32 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
33 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302. 
34 Id.  See also United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a “law 
prohibiting persons who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 
survives Second Amendment scrutiny”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that “although the Second Amendment protects the individual right to pos-
sess firearms for defense of hearth and home . . . a felony conviction disqualifies an individ-
ual from asserting that interest”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(stating that although the Court in Heller did not specifically define the limits of Second 
Amendment rights, it did highlight that the right was not unlimited); United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the focus should be on an individual who was law-
abiding when shaping the individual’s right to possess firearms for self-defense); United 
States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (focusing on Heller and its belief that the core 
purpose of the Second Amendment was to allow “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home[,]” which would not include those who were convicted 
felons). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/6
2015 GETTING STRICT WITH JUDGES 727 
portant governmental objective.35  The court found that preventing 
criminal possession of firearms is a very significant objective, and 
keeping firearms away from people who have previously broken the 
law is substantially related to that goal.36  It also noted that the de-
fendant would have been able to obtain a gun permit, but nevertheless 
chose not to, thereby breaking the law for a second time by pos-
sessing an unlicensed firearm.37  The court emphasized that New 
York’s criminal possession laws prohibit the unlicensed possession of 
handguns because under Penal Law section 265.20(a)(3), “a person 
who has a valid, applicable license for his or her handgun commits no 
crime.”38  Furthermore, a premise-residence license for the home is 
not difficult to obtain because under Penal Law section 400.00(2)(a), 
“[s]ubject to some qualifications, a ‘householder’ is entitled to a li-
cense to ‘have and possess in his dwelling’ a pistol or revolver.”39  
Thus, the court concluded that under intermediate scrutiny, Penal 
Law section 265 did not violate the defendant’s right to keep and bear 
arms.40 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO SECOND AMENDMENT 
CHALLENGES 
The Second Amendment states “[a] well regulated Militia, be-
ing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”41  Although the Second Amend-
ment protects instances of lawful weapons possession, not all conduct 
is protected.  In 1938, over a century after the states ratified the Sec-
ond Amendment, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting convicted 
felons and misdemeanants who had been convicted of violent offens-
es from possessing firearms.42  At that time, the crime was labeled 
“receipt of a gun that crossed state lines” and possession of a firearm 
was evidence of “receipt.”43  This statute initially covered only a few 
 
35 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 301. 
39 Id. 
40 Hughes, 1 N.E.3d at 302. 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
42 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (citing Federal Firearms Act, c. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 
1251). 
43 Id. 
5
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violent offenses, but in 1961, Congress enacted a ban on possession 
by all felons.44  In 1968, Congress revised the statute, and the term 
“receipt” was amended to mean “possession.”45 
The current confusion started with the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in District of Columbia v. Heller,46 and its failure to decide the 
appropriate standard for reviewing cases challenging gun control 
laws.  In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the “Second Amend-
ment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.”47  Heller was 
a law enforcement officer who was permitted to carry a handgun 
while on duty, but was not allowed to register a handgun to keep in 
his home.48  The District of Columbia essentially prohibited the pos-
session of handguns because the statute criminalized carrying an un-
registered firearm and prohibited the registration of firearms.49  The 
Court found these prohibitions unconstitutional, holding that a com-
plete ban on the possession of usable handguns in an individual’s 
home violated the Second Amendment.50  When determining whether 
the challenged law passed constitutional muster, the Court implied 
that it was not necessary to decide which level of scrutiny to apply 
because prohibiting usable firearms in the home for protection would 
be unconstitutional under any of the three standards of scrutiny.51  
The Court did state that the rational basis test was definitely inappli-
cable when evaluating Second Amendment challenges to federal laws 
because under such a low standard, almost all laws would pass this 
test and “the Second Amendment would be redundant . . . and would 
have no effect.”52  However, the Court made it clear that although the 
Second Amendment protected an individual’s right to keep firearms 
in the home for self-defense, this right is not unlimited.53  For exam-
 
44 Id. (citing Pub. L. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (extending the scope of disqualified persons to 
include any individual convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceed-
ing one year,” which is the current definition of a “felony”)). 
45 Id. 
46 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
47 Id. at 622. 
48 Id. at 575. 
49 Id. at 574-75. 
50 Id. at 635. 
51 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29. 
52 Id. at 628 n.27 (“[O]bviously, the [rational basis] test could not be used to evaluate the 
extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of 
speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and 
bear arms.”). 
53 Id. at 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlim-
6
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ple, the possession of firearms by felons would still be prohibited, 
just as it has been for many years.54 
Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,55 the Su-
preme Court held that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms is fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.56  In McDonald, the City of Chicago argued that its laws ban-
ning almost all private citizens from possessing a handgun were con-
stitutional because the Second Amendment rights established by 
Heller did not apply to the States.57  However, the Court stated that, 
“a provision of the Bill of Rights that protects a right that is funda-
mental from an American perspective applies equally to the Federal 
Government and the States.”58  McDonald and Heller made it clear 
that the Second Amendment applies to the States and its citizens.  On 
the other hand, the Court neglected to provide sufficient guidance on 
how these rights should be interpreted and regulated.  Moreover, the 
Court failed to discuss limitations on the Second Amendment and 
how far the legislature could go before infringing that right. 
IV. CONFUSION AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate the appropriate level 
of scrutiny, if any, to be used when a law is challenged under the 
Second Amendment left lower courts with little guidance.  This lack 
of guidance is illustrated in inconsistent analyses and outcomes.  The 
lower courts’ justifications for adopting a particular standard are just 
as inconsistent and, at times, arbitrary based upon a court’s individual 
preference for a specific policy.  All of these inconsistencies demon-
strate the enormous amount of discretion afforded to judges when re-
viewing these challenges. 
Some courts have held that laws burdening the Second 
Amendment should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.59  For 
 
ited. . . .  [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms . . . .”). 
54 Id. 
55 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
56 Id. at 750. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 791. 
59 See Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 97; 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 861 (2015) 
(stating that under intermediate scrutiny, a law that infringes on the Second Amendment 
“must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives”). 
7
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example, in United States v. Marzzarella,60 the Third Circuit evaluat-
ed a Second Amendment challenge to a federal firearm law.61  The 
defendant was indicted for possessing a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number.62  The court concluded that depending on the law in 
question, different standards of scrutiny could be applicable under the 
Second Amendment.63  The court further held that a statute prohibit-
ing the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers should 
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny because “[t]he burden im-
posed by the law [did] not severely limit the possession of fire-
arms.”64 
The Marzzarella court interpreted Heller as implying that a 
two-pronged approach be used when Second Amendment challenges 
are made.65  Under this approach, the court first “ask[s] whether the 
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope 
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”66  If not, then the conduct is 
not protected and the court’s inquiry is complete.67  However, if the 
conduct does fall within the Second Amendment’s protections, then 
the court must apply a form of “means-end scrutiny” to determine the 
statute’s constitutionality.68 
In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit referred to analogous First 
 
60 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
61 Id. at 89. 
62 Id. at 88; accord id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)), which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport, ship, or re-
ceive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had the 
importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or al-
tered or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s 
or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, 
at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce. 
Id. 
63 Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. 
64 Id. at 97 (comparing the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban in Heller, 
which was not just a regulation but a blanket prohibition on the right to protect one’s “hearth 
and home,” with 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which was in no way similar to that level of infringe-
ment because “it leaves a person free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm he chooses—
so long as it bears its original serial number”). 
65 Id. at 89. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Marzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; accord Heller, 670 F.3d at 1257 (“[A] regulation that im-
poses a substantial burden upon the core right of self-defense protected by the Second 
Amendment must have a strong justification, whereas a regulation that imposes a less sub-
stantial burden should be proportionately easier to justify.”). 
8
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Amendment cases when formulating its intermediate scrutiny in-
quiry.69  In the First Amendment context, intermediate scrutiny is 
sometimes applied to laws limiting free speech and requires that “the 
regulation serve ‘an important or substantial’ interest and not ‘burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary’ to further that interest.”70  
The court found intermediate scrutiny to be appropriate because the 
challenged law regulated the manner in which Second Amendment 
rights were carried out, not the actual exercise of the right.71  The 
court stated that the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged law 
serves a “significant,” “substantial,” or “important” governmental in-
terest and, if so, whether the “fit between the challenged [law] and 
the asserted objective is reasonable.”72  The Marzzarella court found 
that the challenged statute survived intermediate scrutiny because the 
statute’s goal of allowing law enforcement to trace firearms was a 
substantial interest.73  Although the court found intermediate scrutiny 
to be appropriate, it also concluded that the statute was constitutional 
under strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to the Govern-
ment’s interest in tracing firearms.74  Therefore, a statute prohibiting 
possession of a firearm with obliterated serial numbers comports with 
that objective.75 
Some courts went as far as stating that all laws burdening 
Second Amendment rights should be reviewed under intermediate 
scrutiny.  In United States v. Skoien,76 the Seventh Circuit determined 
that some categorical prohibitions on gun possession are permissible, 
and established that “[C]ongress is not limited to case-by-case exclu-
sions of persons who have been shown to be trustworthy with weap-
ons, nor need these limits be established by evidence presented in 
court.”77  In Skoien, the defendant had two prior convictions for do-
mestic violence and as a result was forbidden to carry firearms under 
18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9).78  While on probation for one of his do-
mestic violence convictions, the defendant was found in possession 
 
69 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99. 
70 Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994)). 
71 Id. at 97. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 98. 
74 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99. 
75 Id. 
76 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
77 Id. at 641. 
78 Id. at 639. 
9
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of three firearms in violation of the statute.79  The Seventh Circuit de-
termined that intermediate scrutiny applied to laws restricting firearm 
possession, deciding that there was no need to delve deeper into the 
“levels of scrutiny” issue.80  Under intermediate scrutiny, the court 
questioned whether the challenged statute was “substantially related 
to an important governmental objective,” and concluded that the goal 
of the statute was to prevent “armed mayhem,” which was clearly an 
important government objective.81 
The Second Circuit also applied intermediate scrutiny when 
posed with a Second Amendment challenge.  In Kachalsky v. County 
of Westchester,82 the plaintiffs argued that New York City’s “proper 
cause” requirement for obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weap-
on was unconstitutional because it burdened Second Amendment 
rights set forth by Heller.83  The Second Circuit determined that in-
termediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to review the chal-
lenge under the often-used interest-balancing test.84  The conduct 
clearly came within the scope of the Second Amendment and the 
court continued its inquiry as to whether it outweighed the govern-
mental objective.85  The Second Circuit concluded that regulating 
firearm possession and limiting it to individuals who show they have 
a special need for self-defense serve the best interests of public safety 
and are greater than the individual’s need for protection in an unex-
pected confrontation.86 
On the other hand, some courts have rejected any type of bal-
ance-inquiry analysis.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit, in Peruta v. 
County of San Diego,87 stated that the interest-balancing test being 
used under intermediate scrutiny was almost identical to the “interest-
balancing inquiry” that Justice Breyer proposed and the majority 
clearly rejected in Heller.88  The statute at issue in Peruta prohibited 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id.641-42. 
81 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641-42. 
82 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
83 Id. at 88. 
84 Id. at 96. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 100. 
87 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
88 Id. at 1176 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 689-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
for Second Amendment challenges, a court should inquire “whether the statute burdens a 
protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary 
effects upon other important governmental interests”); see also id. at 634-35 (majority opin-
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/6
2015 GETTING STRICT WITH JUDGES 733 
the open or concealed carrying of firearms in public, whether they 
were loaded or unloaded, absent “good cause.”89  The court in Peruta 
rejected both intermediate and strict scrutiny.90  It found that weigh-
ing the government’s interest and objectives against an individual’s 
interest in his Second Amendment right ignores Heller.91  The Peruta 
court reasoned that in Heller, the Supreme Court insisted that by 
enumerating this right, the government is no longer allowed to decide 
whether the right is extended to some and not to others because it is a 
fundamental right.92  The court in Peruta found that when any law 
destroys a fundamental right then there is no need to apply any stand-
ard of scrutiny; the law must simply be “struck down.”93  It should be 
noted that the Ninth Circuit focused its Second Amendment analysis 
on “law-abiding” citizens, thus excluding its application to convicted 
felons.94 
Other courts have held that strict scrutiny is the correct stand-
ard to apply when analyzing laws that burden a citizen’s Second 
Amendment rights.  For example, in United States v. Engstrum,95 the 
district court of Utah found strict scrutiny to be the appropriate level 
when analyzing 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9), which made it “unlaw-
ful to possess a firearm if the individual ‘has been convicted in any 
court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.’ ”96  After an al-
tercation with his girlfriend, the defendant was found to be in posses-
sion of an unlicensed gun in his home.97  The defendant claimed that 
his father gave him a gun prior to his death, but was advised that he 
could not have a gun because of a prior misdemeanor domestic vio-
lence conviction.98  The defendant was found guilty in violation of 
 
ion) (rejecting a “judge empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ ” as a test for constitutional-
ity of Second Amendment laws)). 
89 Id. at 1147. 
90 Id. at 1197. 
91 Id. at 1177. 
92 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634) (“The very enumeration of the 
right takes out of the hands of government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”). 
93 Id. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29) (stating that “a l[a]w that ‘under the pretence of 
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right’ would not pass constitutional muster 
‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights’ ”). 
94 Id. at 1150. 
95 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009). 
96 Id. at 1232. 
97 Id. at 1228-29. 
98 Id. at 1229. 
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the statute and appealed his conviction.99  He argued that section 
922(g)(9) impermissibly burdened his Second Amendment rights by 
punishing him for keeping a firearm in his residence to defend his 
home and was therefore unconstitutional.100 
The Engstrum court applied strict scrutiny to determine the 
constitutionality of section 922(g)(9).101  According to the court, be-
cause Heller described the right to keep and bear arms as a funda-
mental right, strict scrutiny should be applied.102  Under strict scruti-
ny, the court found that section 922(g)(9) was narrowly tailored and 
promoted a compelling state interest because presumably, those who 
are convicted of crimes of domestic violence pose a possible threat of 
violence to an intimate partner or child.103  Therefore, the court held 
that 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9) was constitutional under the Second 
Amendment.104 
In sum, the majority of circuit courts mentioned above have 
applied intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges for 
varying reasons. 
V. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
The Supreme Court’s ambiguity in both Heller and McDonald 
with respect to laws limiting and restricting Second Amendment 
rights not only led to confusion among the circuit courts regarding 
which level of scrutiny to apply, but also presented challenges for 
state courts when interpreting state laws and regulations.  New 
York’s Civil Rights Law section 4 states: “A well regulated militia 
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed.”105  Although New York 
adopted its own version of the Second Amendment, the right to keep 
and bear arms in New York is not unlimited, and there have been 
 
99 Id. at 1232. 
100 Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. 
101 Id. at 1231. 
102 Id. (citing Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If a fun-
damental right were at stake, only heightened scrutiny would have been appropriate.”); and 
Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will . . . ap-
ply strict scrutiny if the state’s classification burdens the exercise of a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”)). 
103 Id. at 1235. 
104 Id. 
105 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 4 (McKinney 1990). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/6
2015 GETTING STRICT WITH JUDGES 735 
challenges to New York statutes that restrict this right. 
The majority of New York State courts have applied interme-
diate scrutiny when faced with a Second Amendment challenge.  In 
People v. Perkins,106 the defendant was involved in an argument, 
which escalated to the point where the defendant pulled out a hand-
gun and shot at the victim.107  Although the victim was not injured, 
the defendant fled the scene.108  The defendant was convicted of vio-
lating Penal Law section 265 for criminal possession of a weapon be-
cause he was previously convicted of a felony.109  The defendant ar-
gued that Penal Law section 265 violated the Second Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.110  The Appellate Division, Third De-
partment rejected the defendant’s argument because the statute did 
not implement a blanket prohibition on handguns and, therefore, was 
not a “severe restriction” improperly infringing upon defendant’s 
Second Amendment rights.111  The court also acknowledged the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Heller, stating that although the Second 
Amendment protects individual rights to keep and bear arms for self-
defense within one’s home, it “is not absolute and may be limited by 
reasonable governmental restrictions.”112 
Despite the lack of sufficient guidance, some New York 
courts engaged in an appropriate analysis when deciding which 
standard to apply.  In People v. Nivar,113 the defendant was arrested 
for grabbing a woman by her arm, pushing her against a wall and 
choking her inside an apartment.114  Approximately one month later, 
a police officer allegedly observed that the defendant possessed both 
a black handgun and an air pistol inside his bedroom.115  The defend-
ant was then charged with criminal possession of a weapon, pursuant 
to Penal Law section 265.01.116  The defendant argued that Penal 
Law section 265.01 was unconstitutional because it prohibited his 
 
106 880 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2009). 
107 Id. at 210. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
111 Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d at 210. 
112 Id. 
113 915 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2011). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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right to possess a firearm in his home for self-defense.117  He also ar-
gued that strict scrutiny should apply to this statute because “the re-
strictions on gun ownership are overbroad, the state’s licensing 
scheme is arbitrary and capricious and it prevents indigent citizens 
from legally possessing firearms.”118  The defendant contended that 
under a strict scrutiny analysis, the statute would fail.119 
The New York Supreme Court determined that intermediate 
scrutiny should apply to this case because “the majority of courts to 
have considered this issue” have held intermediate scrutiny “is the 
most appropriate standard of review to apply to” firearms regula-
tions.120  The court also found intermediate scrutiny more appropriate 
than strict scrutiny because the challenged statute does not ban all 
handguns and, therefore, is “not a ‘severe restriction’ improperly in-
fringing upon defendant’s Second Amendment rights.”121  The Nivar 
court concluded that Penal Law section 265.01 and the state’s licens-
ing scheme are constitutional because the state has a substantial inter-
est in regulating firearms and restricting their use to those who have 
the character necessary to be trusted with such a dangerous instru-
ment.122 
Other New York courts attempted to take the necessary steps 
to determine the appropriate standard but erred in their analysis.  For 
example, in People v. Foster,123 two firearms were found inside the 
defendant’s home.124  The defendant was charged with two counts of 
criminal possession of a firearm pursuant to Penal Law section 
265.01 because he failed to apply for a license to legally possess the 
firearms.125  The defendant moved to dismiss the charges contending 
that Penal Law section 265.01 violated the Second Amendment.126  
 
117 Id. at 803. 
118 Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 803. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 808-09. 
121 Id. at 806 (citing People v. Abdullah, 870 N.Y.S.2d 886, 23 Misc. 3d 232, 234 (Crim. 
Ct. Kings County 2008)); accord Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 209. 
122 Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citing Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2005)) (“The 
State has a substantial and legitimate interest . . . in insuring the safety of the general public 
from individuals who, by their conduct, have shown themselves to be lacking the essential 
temperament or character which should be present in one entrusted with a dangerous instru-
ment” (quoting In re Pelose, 384 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1976))). 
123 915 N.Y.S.2d 449; 30 Misc. 3d 596 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2010). 
124 Id. at 597. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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The defendant also argued that New York’s licensing scheme, under 
Penal Law section 400.00(6) and 38 RCNY chapter 5, was “arbitrary 
and capricious,” and violated the Second Amendment.127 
The Supreme Court of Bronx County rejected the defendant’s 
argument and found the challenged statutes constitutional because 
“[u]nlike the statute at issue in Heller, Penal Law article 265 does not 
effect a complete ban on handguns and is, therefore, not a ‘severe re-
striction’ improperly infringing upon defendant’s Second Amend-
ment rights.”128  However, although the Heller Court implied that a 
complete ban is a severe restriction, it did not implicitly limit it to on-
ly complete bans; therefore, a severe restriction can be something 
less.  Nonetheless, the court also found that New York’s licensing 
scheme for regulating firearms was not an improper infringement on 
Second Amendment rights because New York City’s licensing 
scheme is rational with proper court oversight.129  Furthermore, the 
court noted that the defendant did not even try to obtain a license le-
gally, and was therefore, “hard-pressed to challenge the rationality of 
New York’s premise residence license laws.”130 
VI. DISCUSSION 
New York has continuously applied intermediate scrutiny to 
Second Amendment challenges and has also consistently upheld the 
challenged statutes.  It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeals did 
not engage in a detailed analysis as to whether Penal Law section 
265.03 should have been reviewed under strict scrutiny.  By assum-
ing that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard, the Court 
of Appeals did the lower courts of New York a disservice.  Interme-
diate scrutiny is easy to overcome because it only requires the gov-
ernment to demonstrate that an objective is important and a reasona-
ble or substantial connection exists between the challenged regulation 
and the government’s objective.  The court uses its broad discretion 
to determine whether the connection between the law and govern-
mental objective is reasonable which allows it to apply intermediate 
scrutiny to policies it agrees with and thus uphold the regulation.  On 
the other hand, application of strict scrutiny imposes a more difficult 
 
127 Id. 
128 Foster, 30 Misc. 3d at 598-99 (citing Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d 210). 
129 Id. at 600. 
130 Id. 
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burden on the government which must demonstrate that the regula-
tion is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental inter-
est and therefore uses the least restrictive methods to achieve its 
goals. 
VII. SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
The inconsistent outcomes of the decisions discussed make it 
clear that the current method used to review Second Amendment 
challenges is problematic.  Solving the problem is less clear; howev-
er, using the circuit court decisions as a guide provides several op-
tions. 
One means of dealing with the issue is to continue using the 
current two-pronged approach.  The court would first determine 
whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct that is with-
in the scope of the Second Amendment.  If the first prong were satis-
fied, then the court would determine whether intermediate or strict 
scrutiny should apply to the particular statute.  This would be deter-
mined by the degree of the burden placed on the defendant’s Second 
Amendment right.  However, the current method of reviewing gun 
regulation challenges is far from perfect because it gives an enormous 
amount of discretion to judges in its application.  This method allows 
judges to determine the strength of the Second Amendment burden 
and then enable them to apply either intermediate or strict scrutiny. 
Another option would be to follow the Peruta court’s ap-
proach.  According to Peruta, when a court reviews a law burdening 
a fundamental right, such as a Second Amendment right, the law 
would automatically be struck down.  However, Penal Law section 
265.01 would be upheld under this approach because, according to 
Peruta, Second Amendment rights are only extended to law-abiding 
citizens. 
Another method is the Engstrum court’s approach to Second 
Amendment challenges.  Because of the involvement of a fundamen-
tal right, application of strict scrutiny will protect the individual’s 
rights as well as the governmental interest if it is compelling and nar-
rowly tailored to meet its objective.  This is the best approach be-
cause it removes some of the discretion from the judges reviewing 
the challenged law.  Judges will no longer have to decide whether in-
termediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny applies to a particular challenge.  
When faced with a challenge to a fundamental right, the court will 
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automatically apply strict scrutiny. 
VIII. ANALYZING PEOPLE V. HUGHES UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY 
The New York Court of Appeals should have reviewed Penal 
Law section 265.01 under strict scrutiny because the law interferes 
with a fundamental right set forth by Heller.  Furthermore, the activi-
ty at issue in People v. Hughes is related to the core Second Amend-
ment right specified in Heller because defendant Hughes possessed a 
gun within his home to defend himself and his home. 
If reviewed under strict scrutiny, the court would have had to 
determine whether Penal Law section 265.01 was narrowly tailored 
to meet the government’s compelling interest.  Presumably the gov-
ernment’s interest is protecting the public and ensuring that people 
who previously violated the law will be arrested and punished more 
severely for breaking the law again by possessing an unlicensed fire-
arm.  Section 265.01 is narrowly tailored to meet the government’s 
compelling objective.  Furthermore, as reiterated in Peruta, the core 
fundamental rights of the Second Amendment are vested in law-
abiding citizens.  Therefore, Penal Law section 265.01 would have 
been upheld under strict scrutiny. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
People v. Hughes touched on a major issue that has been de-
bated within the United States for decades—the correct standard to 
apply when analyzing the scope of the Second Amendment.  The Su-
preme Court has remained silent on many issues dealing with re-
strictions and regulations relating to the Second Amendment and the 
proper approach for reviewing a challenge to such a fundamental 
right under the Constitution.  The circuit courts have all agreed that 
the rights codified by Heller, which were made applicable to the 
states by McDonald, are not unlimited.131  Yet, the right to possess a 
handgun in one’s home for self-defense is arguably the most protect-
ed right that an individual has under the Second Amendment. 
Here, however, not only did Hughes break the law once by re-
sisting arrest, he continued his unlawful habits by purchasing a fire-
arm without first going through the protocols of obtaining a firearm 
 
131 See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89; Skoien, 614 F.3d at 639; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 
95; Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1151. 
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permit, which is required by the Rules of the City of New York.  As 
the court in Hughes pointed out, had the defendant applied for a fire-
arm permit to protect his home, his application likely would have 
been granted because his prior conviction of resisting arrest was rela-
tively minor and did not have a significant impact on his ability to 
possess a firearm.  However, by not abiding by the law yet again the 
defendant was rightfully convicted of a class C felony for possessing 
an unlicensed, loaded firearm in his home subsequent to being con-
victed of a crime.  Al-though the court clearly stated that Hughes 
likely would have been able to obtain a permit, such permission 
would be inconsistent with applying Penal Law section 265.03 to 
him.  The purpose behind the law is to keep guns away from those 
who have committed crimes in the past because the presumption is 
that they are a continuing danger and the court’s notion that Hughes 
would have been allowed to obtain a permit is inconsistent with the 
application of Penal Law section 265.03.  Allowing Hughes to obtain 
a permit indicates that his previous offense was not serious enough to 
consider him a threat, but it is significant enough in its applicability 
to section 265 that it gave him a harsher sentence.  The court is in es-
sence saying that the previous crime is not significant in one instance 
but it is significant in another. 
Hughes is the first case in which the New York Court of Ap-
peals has taken a stance on what level of scrutiny to apply when de-
ciding a Second Amendment issue.  The implications of this decision 
are important.  It can be very dangerous if courts analyze all laws un-
der intermediate scrutiny because almost any law can be justified as 
serving a substantial governmental interest.  This presents a threat 
because it is easy for fundamental rights, such as the Second 
Amendment, to be infringed and eroded by laws and regulations.  
The current method of reviewing Second Amendment issues gives 
judges too much discretion when determining whether the challenged 
law should be upheld and applying strict scrutiny to all of these chal-
lenges allows for some consistency and gives judges less room to 
promote their policy preferences. 
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